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EBERTS V. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
AFTER GILBERT AND SATTY
INTRODUCTION

If the major issue of the sixties was racial discrimination, it
has been replaced in the seventies by sex discrimination.' In
this decade, no other social concern has generated more public
discussion, political devisiveness, legislative action, or judicial
litigation. This has culminated in a massive legal attack upon
sex discrimination through a proposed constitutional amendment, 2 newly enacted and amended statutory laws, 3 and inthat divide
creased judicial scrutiny of state and private actions
4
the populace into gender-based classifications.
The major emphasis in the movement to eliminate sex dis-

crimination concerns employment disparities. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19645 has become the foundation upon which
employees rely for federal redress of private employment practices which have the effect of disadvantaging one sex by separating the workforce into gender-based classifications. Female
employees assert that distinguishing employment policies on
the basis of pregnancy is discriminatory on its face because only
females can become pregnant.6 Employers defend such pregnancy-based classifications on two grounds: 1) they are not gender-based, but are based on the physical characteristic of
pregnancy 7 and, 2) such distinctions do not disadvantage pregnant women because they share equally with men in all other
1. "Of my two 'handicaps,' being female put many more obstacles in
my path than being black." S. CHISOLM, UNBOUGHT AND UNBOSSED Xii
(1970).
2. Equal Rights For Men and Women Amendment (Proposed), H.R. J.
RES. No. 208, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The period allowed for ratification
was extended by H.R. J. REs. No. 638, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976), as amended
by 1978 Amendment to Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076; Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1976).
4. See generally Lopatka, A 1977 Primeron the Federal Regulation of
Employment Discrimination (1977), U. ILL. L.F. 69.

5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
6. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1975), EEOC v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburg, 415 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1975).

460

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:459

company-sponsored benefits, but are denied additional benefits
which non-pregnant employees cannot enjoy. 8
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions attempted to reconcile the conflict. In General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert,9 the Court validated the employer's contention that a
disability insurance plan which excluded pregnancy from its
coverage did not do so on the basis of sex, but on the sex-unique
characteristic of pregnancy. 10 Because both sexes could share
equally in coverage under the plan, the denial of pregnancy coverage was an exclusion to women that men could not enjoy and
was therefore non-discriminatory.11 Agreeing with employees
in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 12 the Supreme Court refined its
position, finding that not all differential treatment of pregnancy
by employers would be acceptable under Title VII. The Court
held that an employment policy which denied seniority rights to
pregnant women was not merely a refusal to extend to women
an additional benefit which men could not enjoy, but constituted
an imposition on pregnant women of a substantial burden that
13
men could not suffer.
In Eberts v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,14 the court attempted to reconcile the polar positions of Gilbert and Satty by
basing its finding on the middle ground between the legal precedents. Eberts applied the reasoning of Gilbert to find the
classification of the workforce to be based on pregnancy, not
gender. 15 The denial of seniority rights, unlike the denial of disability benefits, was found to be discriminatory under the Satty
analysis because of the burden it imposed on women. 16 More
importantly, since Eberts included pregnancy distinctions not
included in Gilbert or Satty,17 the trial court was directed to ex8. See, e.g., Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
9. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
10. Id. at 136.
11. Id. at 138-40.
12. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
13. Id. at 142-43.
14. 581 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1978).
15. Id. at 360.
16. Id. at 362.
17. The specific allegations were:
Count I:
Challenge to Westinghouse's policy of providing sickness
and accident benefit payments to employees who must be
absent from work because of non-occupational disabilities,
except disabilities relating to pregnancy or childbirth.
Count UI & II: Challenges to Westinghouse's practice of denying female employees "credited service" and seniority for periods during pregnancy leave.
Count IV: Challenge to the requirement that written notice of the
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amine the other-employment practices for their discriminatory
effect, which was to be weighed by the burden placed on women. 18 Furthermore, all the challenged employment practices
would be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether they violated Title VII. 19
Subsequent to Eberts, the 1978 Amendment to the Civil
Rights Act of 196420 was enacted. This amendment re-defines
sex discrimination under Title VII to specifically include classification among employees based on pregnancy. 21 While this
amendment invalidates the rationale of Gilbert in toto, it only
supersedes Satty and Eberts to the extent that they reflect on
pregnancy-based classifications. To the extent that Satty and
Eberts still apply to non-pregnancy, gender-based classifications, they are still valid.
FACTS AND HOLDING OF THE COURTS

Eberts in the District Court
Twenty-two current and former female employees of the
Westinghouse Corporation and their unions filed a class action
complaint in 1974 against Westinghouse, charging the defendant
with seven counts of Title VII violations 22 centered around two
main allegations: 1) that Westinghouse had violated Title VII by
the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under its sickness and
accident benefits program and, 2) that other policies of the corporation relating to pregnancy leaves discriminated against female employees, particularly the practice of denying seniority
and credited service to females during a company-mandated
pregnancy leave. Three years later, following the Gilbert decision, the district court dismissed the entire complaint. No independent analysis was provided, but the court supported its
decision by referrence to Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.23

Count V:

condition of pregnancy be given during the first five
months of pregnancy as a precondition for a leave of absence.
Challenge to the requirement that females have nine

months of continuous
Count VI:
Count VII:

employment with Westinghouse

before being allowed to take maternity leave.
Challenge to Westinghouse's forced maternity leave.
Union challenges to the above practices in connection
with a national collective bargaining agreement with the
defendant. Id. at 358-59.

18. Id. at 362.
19. See notes 72-77, 89-91 and accompanying text infra.

20.
21.
22.
23.

P.L. 92-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
Id. at § 1.
See note 17 supra.
Order No. 76-1409 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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Lukus involved a single count of discrimination against the
same defendant, based on the company's denial of disability insurance benefits to pregnant employees. The court held such a
denial non-discriminatory and dismissed the complaint because
' '24
Gilbert "was completely dispositive of the issue sub judice.
Eberts in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the district court erred in its reliance on
Lukus. They distinguished Lukus in that it entailed a single
count directed at the defendant's disability insurance plan,
while Eberts went beyond to include challenges to other employment practices as well. Additionally, the plaintiffs raised
new claims of a discriminatory effect and purpose of the disability plan itself, contending that Gilbert was not dispositive of
25
these issues.
The court first interpreted Gilbert as bearing only on a claim
of a disability insurance plan. 26 It then found each of the other
challenged employment policies to result in a sufficient discrimi7
natory effect to establish a cause of action under Title VII.2
24. Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 359 (quoting Lukus v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Order No. 76-1409 (W.D. Pa. 1977)).
25. 581 F.2d at 360. The district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that Gilbert precluded
all issues in Eberts as it had in Lukus. The Eberts plaintiffs objected to this
because, while the Lukus suit was only directed at a disability insurance
plan, their suit involved other counts that Lukus had not challenged. Pointing to their challenges in Counts II and III, the plaintiffs claimed the intervening Satty decision controlled on these issues and appealed that the
district court had either misread or misapplied Gilbert to their suit.
26. The court's limitation of Gilbert to a disability insurance plan was
based on a review of the evidence presented in both Gilbert and the decision on which Gilbert was based, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Id.
Both involved only a claim against a disability insurance plan. In
Geduldig, the plaintiffs attacked a state-provided accident and disability insurance plan on constitutional grounds; in Gilbert the challenged plan was
a company-provided disability insurance plan which was attacked under Title VII. Both plans were found non-discriminatory based on the evidence
presented as to the parity of benefits for all employees under the plan's
coverage schedule. Eberts concluded that since the evidence presented in
both cases only involved a disability insurance arrangement, the authority
of Gilbert should be limited to only that situation. Id.
27. 581 F.2d at 359-60. The court prefaced its analysis of the merits of the
plaintiffs' contention by articulating the standard of review to be used in its
decision. The specific issue on appeal was the validity of the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. The court of appeals'
review, therefore, would be confined to the facts of each count; the decision
would be only whether the facts pleaded could prove a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII.
The Eberts court quoted the test established by the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson, 416 U.S. 41 (1974), as its determinative standard: a dismissal on the pleadings should occur "only if it appears beyond a reason-
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While the court rejected the allegations of a discriminatory effect or purpose in the disability plan itself, this rejection was
based on the grounds that the complaint as originally written
did not sufficiently plead these claims, and was therefore, precluded by Gilbert.28 However, since these claims were not denied on substantive grounds, the court left the final decision to
the district court to determine if the plaintiffs had procedurally
preserved the right to amend their pleadings to establish their
29
claims.
On the basis of these findings, the court reversed the district
able doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim .. " Id. at 45-46. Procedurally, the court views the allegations as
admitted to determine their sufficiency as a legal cause of action. Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
In the Eberts case, then, the court confined its decision to the sufficiency of the facts pleaded by the plaintiffs to establish a cause of action
based on the two opposing precedents of the Gilbert and Satty holdings,
but did not make any determination as to proof of these allegations. Eberts
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d at 359-60.
28. Id. The court's conclusion that the merit of the plaintiffs' cause of
action must be determined on the allegations as pleaded in the original
complaint only was in accord with other decisions following the Gilbert
holding. In Guse v. J.C. Penny Co., 562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977), the court also
refused to consider allegations of the discriminatory effect of a medical insurance and sickness benefit plan raised during the appeal. In response to
the argument that the case should be remanded to allow the plaintiffs to
prove "discriminatory impact" the court said:
With all due deference to the liberal pleading rules embodied in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we cannot believe that anyone reading those five words (utterly unsupported by any factual allegations)
would understand this complaint to be attacking the company's benefits package as a whole, in terms of aggregate risk protection. The
course of proceedings in the district court reinforces this conclusion, as
it demonstrates that no one connected with this lawsuit has ever so understood the complaint. Id. at 8.
Similar requests to allow allegations pleaded at the appellate level, but
not specifically pleaded in the original complaint, have been denied in Women in City Government United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1977) (the court barred the plaintiffs from proving the disparate impact of a
disability insurance plan on appeal when the theory had not been pleaded
at the district court level) and in Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.
Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (failure of pleading to challenge total company
benefits as discriminatory precluded inquiry into the discriminatory effect
of a company insurance plan).
29. 581 F.2d at 362 n.3. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) as a basis for the action to allow an
amendment to the pleadings. In Foman, the Court found a district court in
error for denying the petitioner's motion to amend a complaint. Emphasizing that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate proper judgment, the Court
stated that the Federal Rules interpret this to allow amendments to the
pleadings to be freely given unless there is a strong countervailing interest
to be protected from such amendments. The Court concluded that a refusal
to grant a leave to amend without a justifiable reason is an abuse of the
district court's discretion to allow such amendments and contrary to the
spirit of the Federal Rules. 371 U.S. at 182.

464

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:459

court's dismissal of counts two through seven and remanded for
further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of count
one without prejudice to the plaintiffs to seek to amend their
pleadings in the district court. 30 In effect, the court held that
Gilbert had not settled all pregnancy-related issues and that the
plaintiffs did, in fact, have a viable cause of action on issues
other than the disability plan.
OPINION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

DiscriminationPer Se
The threshold question for the Eberts court was the determination of whether the denial of benefits to pregnant employees constituted discrimination per se 3 ' under Title VII. Two
opposing standards framed the issue: the EEOC interpretation
of Title VII, which expressly defines such exclusions as dis30. 581 F.2d at 362 n.3:

The result we have reached with respect to Count I is without prejudice
to the plaintiffs to seek to amend their pleadings in the district court
...We express no view on whether any such motion to amend should
be granted by the district court, as it is a determination for that court in
the first instance.
31. Title VII prohibits sex discrimination. The fundamental question in
these suits is whether the division of the workforce on the basis of pregnancy or any other sex-related characteristic is a classification based on
sex. If a distinction between employees on the basis of pregn ncy is found
to be sex-based, then the mere proof that such a distinction exists establishes the plaintiff's cause of action, eliminating the requirement of proof of
a discriminatory effect or intent. It further necessitates a showing by the
defendant that there is a bona fide occupational reason for the distinction;
absent proof of this, the plaintiff's challenge is upheld. See Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971) and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969).
The controversy here is that all distinctions between men and women
are not necessarily sex-based. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975). While Gilbert held that classifications based on pregnancy were not
gender-based, City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370
(1978) found a distinction between employees which forced women to pay a
greater amount into a company pension plan than men was sex-based,
rather than based on the characteristic of expected life longevity, which the
defendant had claimed. The Manhart Court said, "the practice was discriminatory in its treatment of a person in a manner which for the person's sex
would be different." 98 S. Ct. at 1377.
Furthermore, distinctions which are based on actual physical characteristics are not upheld if the distinctions are based on stereotyped characterizations of one sex's ability to perform. Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co.,
477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3d Cir. 1973) (hiring policy which refused to employ women because of the employer's assumption that women were physically unable to perform each and every production job was found sex-based) and
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 1969) (job assignment restricting women to jobs not requiring lifting more than 35 pounds
were found discriminatory when restriction was based on employer's generalization about female strength).
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crimination per se, and the constitutional standard, as applied to
Gilbert, which does not.
HistoricalBackground
To assure equal employment opportunities in private industry, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
delineated its purpose as the elimination of discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 32 To implement these goals, Congress created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and charged
the agency with the authority to interpret the Act. 33 In 1972,
Congress amended Title VII to clarify its intent regarding sex
discrimination, 34 and the EEOC amended its guidelines to expressly define sex discrimination under Title VII as: exclusion
from employment because of pregnancy, 35 distinctions between
failure
men and women with regard to fringe benefits,36 and the
37
to treat pregnancy as any other temporary disability.
Prior to 1976, the courts had developed a dual approach to
challenges to sex-based classifications. The Supreme Court
maintained its refusal to label sex a suspect classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 38 The result was that plaintiffs'
32.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253. See also

H.R. REP. No. 914,1,88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2401, 2401: '"The purpose of this Title is to eliminate through utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment."
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(4) (1976).
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, P.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 1005.
See also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1971): "Discrimination
against women is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to
any type of unlawful discrimination."
35. The EEOC adopted the Labor Department's regulations under the
Equal Pay Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1976): "(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or
employees because of pregnancy is a prima facie violation of Title VII."
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1976) states: "(a) 'Fringe benefits' as used
herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an embenefits ....
loyer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benets."
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1976) states: "(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery
thereof, are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities . . . and
payments under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave
plan ... shall be applied ... as they are applied to other temporary disabil-

ities."
38. For an analysis of the standard of strict judicial scrutiny see Justice
Powell's separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) where Justice Powell defines strict scrutiny as
"call(ing) for the most exacting judicial examination . . . [classifications
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challenges to the constitutionality of sex-based classifications
were seldom upheld because the burden of proof required that
the classifications be intentionally imposed without a "fair or rational basis," 39 or that they be based on "archaic" or "overbroad
40
generalizations" about behavior.
In contrast to the constitutional interpretation, the courts
imposed a stricter construction in Title VII suits brought against
private employers for gender-based classifications. Because the
legislative intent was unclear as to which practices constituted
sex discrimination under Title VII, 41 courts gave deference to
subject to strict scrutiny] must be precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." Id. at 2749.
Justice Powell, while adhering to the traditional view that racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect, does not treat sex as a
suspect classification; his view is that "the Court has never viewed such
classifications as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic
classifications for the purpose of equal-protection analysis." Id. at 2755. But
see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) where a plurality of four
Justices were willing to find sex classifications inherently suspect and subject to the same strict scrutiny accorded classifications based on race, although this finding was not necessary to the result.
39. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court explicitly rejected strict scrutiny for sex classifications but held for the female plaintiffs
on the grounds that a classification based on sex must bear a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 76.
40. See Craig v. Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), where the majority found a
middle ground between the strict scrutiny of Frontieroand the fair and substantial relation of Reed by applying "intermediate" level scrutiny. Id. at
218. An Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males under
twenty-one and to females under eighteen had relied on statistical data to
prove the disparity in the drinking habits of each sex as a rational basis for
the distinction. The Court rejected the data as "loose-fitting generalities
concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups" and overturned
the statute. Id. at 209.
Other generalizations found invalid by the Supreme Court on the basis
of "irrationality" include Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 210 (1975) (generalizations about working women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 119 (1975)
(generalizations about the role of women in society); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1971) (presumptions about the ability of unmarried fathers to
raise their children).
41. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199, 202 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S.

737 (1976): "The legislative history pertaining to the addition of the word
"sex" to the Act is indeed meager. It appears that the amendment to the
Act was offered in a tongue-in-cheek manner with the intent to undermine
the entire Act and assist in its defeat." See also 110 CONG. REC. 2484-85
(1964). Originally, the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include sex
in its list of protected classifications. When the passage of the Act seemed
inevitable, a coalition of Southern congressmen opposing the Act insisted
that it be added, believing this would insure the Act's defeat because some
members of Congress, who favored elimination of racial discrimination,
would oppose affording equal protection to women. Although independent
legislative action to eliminate sex discrimination could not have found support in Congress at that time, determination to provide racial protection
prevailed and the Act was passed. As a result, the movement to eliminate
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the EEOC interpretations 4 2 unless there was clear evidence of
contrary congressional intent.43 Using the EEOC guidelines,
eighteen federal district courts and all seven federal circuit
courts of appeals which considered cases alleging sex discrimination to pregnant employees, determined that the congressional intent in enacting Title VII was to prohibit sex
44
classifications based on pregnancy in employment situations.
The Supreme Court rejected the EEOC standard for Title
VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert by holding that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under a company's disability
insurance program did not constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII.4 5 The Court refused to follow the EEOC guidelines
because the 1972 guidelines contradicted the agency's position
when the Act was passed6 and were in conflict with legislative
pronouncements that the47 Court felt more accurately reflected
the congressional intent.
sex discrimination was strengthened with Title VII eventually becoming its
strongest judicial weapon. This eleventh-hour move left the courts with a
lack of legislative history on the meaning of sex discrimination under Title
VII.
42. Id. at 202-03. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
43. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The petitioner
alleged discrimination against her because of national origin. The Supreme
Court concluded the EEOC guidelines did not have application because of
contrary legislative action by Congress: "[TIhe guideline relied on ... is no
doubt entitled to great deference [citing cases], but that deference must
have limits where, as here, application of the guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to reach the employment
practice in question." Id. at 94.
44. Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.
1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons Inc., 514 F.2d
651 (8th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers v. A.T.&T., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975); Farkas v. South Western City School District, 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir.
1975). See S. REP. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess., 6-8 (1977).
45. 429 U.S. at 145-46.
46. Id. at 141-45. The Court emphasized that the 1972 guidelines were
issued eight years after the enactment of the Statute and therefore were not
a contemperaneous interpretation; additionally, the Court felt they contradicted an earlier opinion of the General Counsel of the EEOC made two
years after Title VII's enactment in which the General Counsel interpreted
the salary continuation program and insurance benefit programs which excluded disabilities resulting from pregnancy as not discriminatory.
47. Id. at 144. The Gilbert Court focused on § 703(h) of Title VII which
makes interpretations of the Equal Pay Act applicable to Title VII. The
Wage & Hour Administrator under the Equal Pay Act had stated:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar benefits to employees are equal for both men and women, no wage differential prohibited by the equal pay provisions will result from such
payments, even though the benefits which accrue to the employees in
question are greater for one sex than the other. The mere fact that the
employer may make unequal contributions for employees of opposite
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Instead, the Court favored the determination of an earlier
constitutional action, Geduldig v. Aiello, 48 which found the applicable standard to be that pregnancy-based exclusions were
not discriminatory on their face. 49 In Geduldig the Supreme
Court concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from a list of
covered non-occupational disabilities under a state accident and
insurance program was not discriminatory on its face because
the group of eligible recipients for benefits-non-pregnant persons-consisted of both men and women to whom the fiscal and
actual benefits accrued equally. The Court reasoned, that in effect, women were not excluded because of a gender distinction,
but because their physical condition-pregnancy-was removed
from the list of comprehensive disabilities. 5 0 The Gilbert Court
construed Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on gender
where all disadvantaged persons are of one sex and all advantaged persons are of the other.5 1 The division of eligible and
ineligible recipients by an exclusion based on the sex-unique
characteristic of pregnancy was not gender-related and, there52
fore, not discrimination per se under Title VII.
The impact of the Gilbert decision was immediate. Both
houses of Congress introduced legislation designed to overcome
the ruling by specifically re-defining sex discrimination under
Title VII. 53 Using strong language to express their dissatisfacsexes in such a situation will not, however, be considered to indicate

that the employer's payments are in violation of section 6(d), if the resulting benefits are equal for such employees. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d)
(1975).
Because of this interpretation, the Court concluded that if the exclusion of
pregnancy from a benefits plan were judged to be in violation of § 703(a) (1),
it would not be in violation of § 703(h). The Court felt Congress did not
intend such an inconsistency. At the time of the enactment of Title VII Senator Humphrey indicated that such disability exclusions would not be violative of the Act. 110 CONG. REC. 13663-64 (1964). Using this language the
Court concluded that the congressional intent was incorrectly interpreted
in the EEOC guidelines. 429 U.S. at 144-45.
48. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
51. 429 U.S. at 144-45.
52. Id. at 145-46. See generally Larson, Sex Discriminationas to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805, 811 (1975); Note, General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert: The Plight of the Working Woman, 11 J. MAR. J. 215, 223 (1977).
53. H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. and S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Both
bills were introduced on March 15, 1977, the House bill with 81 co-sponsors
and the Senate bill with 29 co-sponsors. The House approved its bill on July
18, 1978. The Senate version had been passed a year earlier in the Summer,
1977. On October 13, 1978, the Conference Committee issued its report.
CoNF. REP. No. 95-1786, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). That same day the Senate, by voice vote, approved the bill, and the House followed two days later.
On October 31, 1978, President Carter signed the 1978 Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 STAT. 2076 (1978).
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tion with the Gilbert decision,54 these legislative amendments to
Title VII underscored Congress' intent to ensure that working
women were protected against all forms of employment discrimination, including discrimination by classifications based on
pregnancy. 55 Not until after the decision in Eberts, however,
56
was a bill enacted into law.
Reaction in the private sector was equally strong. Commentators criticized the adoption of the constitutional standard in
Title VII actions and predicted that the rejection of the EEOC
standard would severely curtail the 7movement to eliminate discriminatory employment practices.
Subsequent to Gilbert, courts could not agree on a uniform
standard for Title VII actions. Some courts that had previously
applied the EEOC guidelines to determine that pregnancybased classifications were discriminatory began to apply Gilbert
to find no violations of Title VII for all gender-based classifications.58 Other courts refused to extend Gilbert beyond any issue specifically addressed in the final decision. 59 Several state
54. S.REP. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977):
Even more important than our disagreement with the Gilbert decision
is the fact that the decision threatens to undermine the central purpose
of the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII... A failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy, in fringe benefits or in any
other employment practice, would prevent the elimination of sex discrimination in employment. Id. at 7. H. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977): "Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, supported the
EEOC guidelines as a reasonable interpretation and implementation of
the broad social objectives of Title VII ... It is the committee's view

that the dissenting Justice(s) correctly interpreted the Act." Id. at 2.
55. S.REP. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) at 6: "In the committee's view these [EEOC] guidelines rightly implemented the Congress' intent in barring sex discrimination in the 1964 Act."
56. See note 53 supra.
57. See generally Note: General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. A Lesson in Sex
Education and Discrimination-TheRelationship Between Pregnancy and
Gender and the Vitality of DisproportionateImpact Analysis, 1977 UTAH L.
REV. 119; Note, Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination-Failure
to Provide Pregnancy DisabilityBenefits Does Not Violate Title VII, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
1202 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Women in City Government United v. City of New York,
563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert.granted, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Guse v. J.C. Penny

Co., 562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977).
Both Circuit Courts of Appeals found a challenge to a company disability insurance plan completely precluded by Gilbert and dismissed the
claim, although the Second Circuit had previously upheld such a claim in
the pre-Gilbert era in Communications Workers v. A.T. & T., 513 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977).
59. Cook v. Arentzen, [19771 14 FED. EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 1643. A female
former U.S. Navy lieutenant challenged a U.S. Navy regulation requiring
termination from service of all officers who became pregnant on equal protection grounds. The Navy defended the regulation by citing the Gilbert
decision as support for the challenged regulation. The court refused to accept the authority of the Gilbert holding on this issue, stating: "[ Gilbert
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courts refused to apply Gilbert to actions in which there was a
contrary state law.6 °

The Standard Used
In its resolution of the discrimination per se issue under Title VII, the Eberts court adhered to the Gilbert standard and
held that since the recipients of the employment benefits consisted of a class of both non-pregnant females and males, no discrimination per se existed.6 1 Eberts' refusal to apply the EEOC
standard was an unquestioning acceptance of Gilbert's dictate
that the EEOC guidelines incorrectly interpreted congressionally-prohibited sex discrimination for all claims under Title
VII. 6 2

While the Eberts court was bound by Gilbert to apply the

has] . .. nothing to do with foreclosing employment opportunity. It is an

insurance case and simply allows the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's disability benefits plan. Nothing in Gilbert
licenses an employer to permanently fire an employee for the 'offense' of
becoming pregnant." Id. at 1645. This argument was later cited in MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977) as support
for that court's decision to refuse the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of Gilbert in a suit challenging an airline's policy of required maternity leaves for pregnant flight stewardesses. The court in
MacLennan found the forced maternity leave policy discriminatory. Accord. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir.
1978), where the court referred to Gilbert as dispositive of an issue invalidating an airline's policy requiring female cabin attendants who became
mothers to resign or accept ground duty positions.
60. Time Insurance Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor, &Human Relations, (Dane County, Wisc. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 1978). Prior to the Gilbert decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had determined that state FEP law
prohibited denial of disability coverage for pregnancy. The Dane County
Circuit Court refused to apply the Gilbert holding in a case before that
court because it concluded that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would not
reinterpret the state law-according to Gilbert to the exclusion of the state's
stricter standards.
In Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York Human Rights Appeal Board,
41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976), the court found that
denial of sick leave benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities constituted
impermissible discrimination under New York state law, and stated: "We
are aware, of course, that the United States Supreme Court has recently
reached a contrary result in construing Title VII ... The determination of
the Supreme Court, while instructive, is not binding on our court.
Id.
at 86, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
61. The Eberts court had no discussion of this issue; instead the court
cited Gilbert as authority for the facial neutrality of the disability plan and
Satty, which applied Gilbert to find the denial of seniority rights non-discriminatory on its face. 581 F.2d at 360-61.
The Satty rationale was if any employee, male or female, took a disability leave, he accumulated seniority; if he or she took any non-disability
leave, including pregnancy, seniority was divested. The distinction was not
between male and female, but between male and females with certain physical characteristics labeled as disabilities and all other males and females.
434 U.S. at 140.
62. The Eberts suit was appealed before the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
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constitutional standard of no discrimination per se for disability
insurance coverage or exclusions, and by Satty for seniority
rights claims, it might have refused to extend this standard to
the remaining facets of the plaintiffs' complaint. The judiciary
has consistently maintained an intent not to be bound by constitutional standards when adjudicating Title VII actions in other
areas of discrimination. 63 The Supreme Court has determined
that the judicial standard in constitutional and Title VII actions
are not identical6 and has affirmed the application of EEOC
guidelines as the authoritative source for definitions of discrimination under the statute. 65 Title VII has never been limited by
constitutional parameters; rather it has been broadened to include practices that could not be found constitutionally discriminatory. 66 At the same time, defenses to such practices have
peals in Pennsylvania. Prior to the Gilbert decision, the Pennsylvania federal courts had applied the EEOC guidelines in suits challenging genderbased classifications in employment and had consistently found such practices to be violative of Title VII. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987, vacated on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.
1973).
After the Gilbert decision, the courts began to rigorously apply the
holding, disregarding the EEOC guidelines to dismiss such actions at the
district court level or reverse previous district court judgments at the appellate level. See EEOC v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 415 F. Supp. 1345
(W.D. Pa. 1976), modified, 556 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S.
1009 (1978).
63. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court
allowed proof of a discriminatory effect, absent the intent necessary in a
constitutional action, to prove a claim of racial discrimination. See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. See generally Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)
(per curiam), where the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment and remanded based on the EEOC interpretation as
to what constituted neutral sex criteria mandated by Title VII for hiring.
66. Id. Phillips,the only Title VII case involving sex discrimination to
be decided by the Supreme Court prior to Gilbert, challenged an employment policy that refused to hire women with pre-school-age children while
hiring similarly-situated men. The Court found this to be violative of Title
VII, even though the defendant argued that both men and women were included in the class of hired employees.
In areas other than sex discrimination, Title VII was broadened to envelop employment practices that merely had a discriminatory effect; see Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (the discriminatory effect
of mandatory employment tests was upheld after plaintiffs proved other
non-discriminatory tests could adequately screen job applicants); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971) (evidence of numerical disparity among classes of employees
proved discrimination under Title VII); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (the purpose of Title VII was defined by the
court to allow an individual Woman to make a choice about the potential
dangerousness of a job rather than the employer).
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been narrowed under Title VII. 6 7 This judicial history suggests
that a narrow application of the constitutional standard to only
those claims controlled by the Gilbert and Satty holdings could
have been justified by the Eberts court.
The DiscriminatoryEffects Issue
Even though the challenged employment practices were
found to be facially neutral, they could still be found discriminatory if it were shown that the distinctions involving pregnancy
were "mere pretexts" designed to discriminate against women. 68
Under the constitutional standard and § 703(a) (1) of Title VII,
such invidious discrimination must be intentionally imposed,
while in actions brought under § 703(a) (2) a mere discriminatory effect, absent proof of intent, will establish a prima facie
69
case of discrimination.
67. Two separate defenses are available in Title VII actions: a justification of a discriminatory practice because of "business necessity" or the
bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) defense under § 703(e).
Burnwell v. Eastern Airlines, [19781 17 FED. EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 1701.
An overriding legitimate business purpose such that a practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business constitutes a business necessity. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). This is met by a showing that the business
purpose is sufficiently compelling to override discriminating impact, the
practice carries out a business purpose, and that there are no acceptable
alternative policies for accomplishing this business purpose. Id. The burden of proof for this necessity is upon the defendant. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
§ 703(e) defines the BFOQ defense as "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1970). The EEOC guidelines state that
"the [BFOQ] as to sex should be interpreted narrowly." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a). It is established when an employer has a factual basis for believing that substantially all persons within a class would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved or that it is
important to deal with persons on an individual basis. Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) the
Court applied this test to find height and weight requirements discriminatory because they were not necessary to the efficient job performance of a
"corrections counsellor" in an Alabama prison, but upheld gender criteria
for employment as a guard in maximum-security institutions because of
their job-related necessity.
Although courts have often failed to distinguish between these two defenses and, instead, viewed them as a single BFOQ defense, e.g. Harriss v.
Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Ca. 1977), Satty indicated that these are two distinct defenses available to an employer. 434 U.S.
at 143.
68. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135; Eberts v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d at 360.
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). Griggs found a
discriminatory effect, absent intent, sufficient to show discrimination under
Title VII § 703(a) (2). Its applicability to § 703(a) (1) has never been determined by the Supreme Court, so the intent requirement for suits under that
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The district court's dismissal of the Eberts complaint was
based on the assumption, held by many courts following the
Gilbert decision,7 0 that the Gilbert Court had found that the prerequisite discriminatory effect necessary to establish such invidious discrimination did not result from any employment policy
that merely denied to pregnant women an additional benefit
men could not enjoy. 7 1 Because this determination was based
on the particular factual situation confronting the Gilbert Court,
the Eberts court considered the factors which compelled this
finding to decide their applicability to the allegations of the
Eberts complaint.
Limitation of the Gilbert Holding

In Gilbert, no discriminatory effect was found because it
was shown that the aggregate risk protection under the chalsection of Title VII remains. See also Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.
Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
70. E.g., EEOC v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburg, 556 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.
1977), reversing 415 F. Supp. 1435 (W.D. Pa. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978) (decided in same circuit as Eberts). The plaintiff had charged the
defendants with a violation of Title VII because of the Hospital's policy of
prohibiting female employees from using their accumulated sick leave for
pregnancy-related disabilities. The district court had found in favor of the
plaintiffs and was reversed on appeal by the Third Circuit on the basis that
"the decision of Gilbert controlled." Id. at 223.
71. The controversy was best summarized in Women in City Government United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 429
U.S. 1033 (1977), where the court refused to allow the plaintiffs' claim of the
disparate impact of a disability insurance plan:
[The plaintiffs'] argument is based on dictum in the General Electric
case, and we find it unpersuasive. In order to bolster the finding of nondiscrimination in General Electric, the Supreme Court noted that the
plaintiffs had not even attempted to prove a discriminatory effect.
While this theoretically implies the possibility of a case based on a disparate impact theory, it hardly amounts to ... [such] a holding. Id. at
540.
The courts' reluctance to allow such actions may have been prompted
by their fear that proof of such impact would involve a monumental evidentiary showing, for the court in Women in City Government United stated
that proof would require the court to examine the value of every compensation plan provided by a company for a showing of disparity in the total value
of all compensation. The court concluded: "To rEad Title VII so ... would
be to impose upon the Act an administrative complexity undreamed of by
its draftsmen. Had the Supreme Court wanted the lower federal courts to
embark on such a course, it would have been far more explicit in the General Electric opinion,.

.

." Id. at 541.

The ambiguity of the majority in Gilbert as to what constituted a discriminatory effect allowed the lower courts to summarily dismiss plaintiffs'
claims on this issue. Furthermore, the lower courts found support in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan and the opinion of Justice Blackman,
who concurred in part. Although both objected to this finding, both read the
majority as saying no discriminatory effect would be found when the benefits under the plan accrued equally to men and women. 429 U.S. at 146 and
155.
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lenged disability insurance plan was the same for both men and
women. 72 This finding was determined by the plaintiffs' failure
to prove that the comprehensive package was worth more to
men than to women and the defendant's evidence that the inclusion of pregnancy would realize a greater economic benefit to
women.7 3 The determinative factors were that the selection of
risks included in the plan covered disabilities applicable to both
sexes, a showing that the total cost to the plan of pregnancy inclusion was prohibitive, and proof that the particular employer
policies which dictated these decisions were objective rather
than invidious. 74 These factors are tied directly to a company's
particular policies and its actuarial basis so, at best, they are
only determinative in a claim involving a disability insurance
plan, and not other employment policies. 75 Therefore, the
72. 429 U.S. at 152. In his dissent, Justice Brennan objected to the majority's view that there were no risks that men were protected from and
women were not, noting that the plan did cover such gender-based disabilities as vasectomies and circumcisions, for which there existed no female
counterpart covered by the plan.
73. Id. at 139-40. The Supreme Court in Gilbert based its finding that
the cost concerns of the defendant constituted a legitimate business necessity for refusing to include pregnancy in the plan on the reasoning of
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). There the defendant produced evidence to show the inclusion of pregnancy in the plan would require the
state either to increase the employee contribution rate above its present 1%
level, or subsidize the plan, or reduce coverage of the disabilities currently
under the plan. As to the first alternative, the Court felt the state had a
legitimate state interest in maintaining the contribution rate at a level not
unduly burdensome to employees, particularly low-income employees. As
to the second alternative, the Court felt nothirg in the state constitution
demanded that the state create a more extensive plan by subsidy. Finally,
the Court felt that pregnancy coverage was no more mandated than any of
the other "expensive" risks the plan had excluded, nor that a reduction of
coverage for disabilities currently included in the plan should be forced to
accommodate the inclusion of pregnancy. Id. at 496-97.
The Gilbert Court stated that the same reasoning applied to a Title VII
action and that additional coverage was not mandated by Title VII if the
parity of benefits under the covered risks was equal.
74. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148. One of the policy reasons stated by the defendant that was decisive in refusing to treat pregnancy as a disability under the coverage was the "voluntary nature" of
pregnancy. The majority agreed with this definition of pregnancy. Justice
Brennan, in his dissent, strongly objected to the Court's characterization of
pregnancy as voluntary; in addition, he noted voluntary disabilities such as
suicide, sports injuries, and other similar "sicknesses" were covered by the
plan. His view that the voluntary nature of pregnancy is an inaccurate defense to a treatment of pregnancy as a non-disability under Title VII has
been validated by Congress and by numerous court decisions. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 95-331, supra note 54.
75. In Gilbert, Justice Brennan would have found a discriminatory effect. He divided the plan into coverage of three groups: 1) coverage of all
disabilities mutually affecting men and women; 2) all disabilities covered
which were particular to men; 3) all disabilities covered which were
predominantly female-based. He noted that the majority concentrated on
the first category only; whereas he felt that the coverage of the second cate-
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Eberts court decided Gilbert was applicable only to the claim
against the disability plan.76 Indeed, by the same reasoning, the
limited Gilbert to only the particular
court might have further 77
plan at issue in that case.
Counts Two Through Seven: Application of the Satty
Standard
The limitation of Gilbert to control only count one of the
Eberts complaint produced an independent finding by the
Eberts court of the discriminatory effect of counts two through
seven which challenged employment practices other than the
defendant's disability plan. Satty had been decided in between
the district court's dismissal of the Eberts complaint and the appeal in the circuit court. The Supreme Court in Satty advanced
a new measure of discriminatory effect by holding that if a denial of a benefit unculy burdened a class of employees, a dis78
criminatory effect in violation of Title VII was established.
The Satty plaintiffs attacked the employer's practice of not classifying pregnancy as a disability and then denying seniority
rights to persons who took non-disability leaves. The denial
meant that these women were relegated to the status of new employees upon return from maternity leave and were forced to
bid for jobs, often being terminated if no new jobs were available. 79 The Court found this denial had a discriminatory effect
gory while excluding pregnancy from the third showed a discriminatory effect. 429 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 581 F.2d at 360:
Gilbert's analysis is thus tied explicitly to the situation of a disability
insurance arrangement. Not only is Geduldig, on which Gilbert relies,
concerned with such a plan, but the Court's discussion in Gilbert of the
effects of the plan is linked closely with its actuarial basis. It appears
therefore that Gilbert should be seen primarily as bearing on a claim
relating to an employer's insurance program, and not as prejudging
other issues relating to employment security.
77. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
78. 434 U.S. 136. The Satty decision, handed down on December 6, 1977,
came exactly one year after the Gilbert opinion on December 7, 1976. The
majority opinion, delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the same Justice who
wrote the majority opinion in Gilbert, finally addressed the ambiguity of the
Gilbert decision in respect to the discriminatory effect controversy. See
note 71 supra.
In the year between these two decisions, it had become apparent that
the lower courts had interpreted Gilbert to say that any policy which provided equal benefits or status to employees could not be faulted for failure
to provide additional benefits for pregnant females. The focus of the lower
courts was on the parity of provided benefits; little to no attention was directed to the legality of the denial of benefits. See, e.g., Grogg v. General
Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Satty Court, therefore,
returned the focus of the legal inquiry back to a measurement of the denied
benefit itself.
79. 434 U.S. at 138-39.
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on women as a class because it imposed a substantial burden on
women that men need not suffer.80 Since counts two and three
of the Eberts complaint paralleled this employment policy and
result, the Eberts court found a discriminatory effect.81
To draw the distinction between a benefit and a burden, the
court focused on § 703(a) (2) of Title VII, which specifically defines a sex classification that deprives an individual of employment status or opportunity as unlawful.8 2 Classification of
pregnancy as a non-disability divests pregnant employees of
their seniority; since male employees do not suffer from the condition of pregnancy, an equal burden of loss and status is not
imposed upon them. Therefore, Satty had held that a discrimi83
natory effect upon women is produced by this classification.
The fact that the loss of status and opportunity was a burden only pregnant women suffered is decisive; it is the point
which distinguishes the result of Gilbert from both the Eberts
80. Id. at 142.

81. 581 F.2d at 361-62.
82. Two separate sections of Title VII are at issue here. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1976) provides:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
In the Gilbert suit, the plaintiffs brought their challenge under
§ 703(a) (1); the Court upheld the disability insurance plan, finding no violation of that section. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
In Satty, however, the plaintiffs' challenge was brought under
§ 703(a) (2). The Court found a violation of Title VII under this provision by
the denial of seniority rights, concluding that this practice affected the employment status and opportunity of employees:
We held in Gilbert that § 703(a) (1) did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other 'because of their different
roles in the scheme of human existence'. . . (citations omitted) ....
But that holding does not allow us to read § 703(a) (2) to permit an em-

ployer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of

employment opportunities because of their different role. 434 U.S. at

142.
The same finding, however, did not apply to the disability insurance
plan, for the Court stated it did not see how a disability plan could ever
deprive a plaintiff of employment status or opportunity. The Court further
suggested that future disability insurance plan challenges be brought under
§ 703(a)(1) rather than § 703(a)(2). Id. at 144-45.
83. 434 U.S. at 140-41.
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and Satty decisions.8 4 In Gilbert, there was equal treatment of
men and women because the aggregate risk protection under
the plan was the same for both; consequently, the exclusion of
pregnancy from the plan's coverage merely failed to provide extra compensation for an additional risk unique to pregnant women. However, a denial of seniority rights to pregnant women
means that they are not equally protected from status or employment loss. Since only pregnant women are less protected,
the denial has a discriminatory effect on women as a class. 85 In
effect, both Eberts and Satty emphasize an insistance that a
court's function is only to insure that all employees be treated
equally. 86 The courts will intervene to prevent employers from
penalizing employees because of pregnancy, but will not force
employers to extend a higher standard of compensation to pregnant employees.8 7 All the maternity leave practices alleged in
counts two through'seven imposed a discriminatory burden on
women and were remanded by the Eberts court for trial on the
issues. 88
84. Id. at 142: "The distinction between benefits and burdens is more
than one of semantics."
85. Id. at 14142. The Court quoted the decision in Gilbert as a comparison: "For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this
risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men
and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of
risks." Id. at 141, citing 429 U.S. at 138.
86. See id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., concurring). This difference between a
benefit and a burden is "illusory" and an inadequate test of discrimination
because the favored class is always benefited and the disfavored class is
always burdened. Justice Stevens preferred a test which determines if the
employer has a policy which adversely affects a woman beyond the term of
her pregnancy leave as a measure of a discriminatory effect.
87. Recent court decisions have emphasized this distinction between
preventing discrimination and affirmatively imposing a judge's conception
of equality, e.g. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970): "Conflicting
claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents
of almost every measure,. . . But the intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems presented ... are not the business of this Court."
Accordingly, while requiring that pregnancy be included in disability insurance plans, the 1978 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
require an employer to create or maintain such a plan at all.
88. 581 F.2d at 362. Both the Eberts and the Satty decisions involved a
denial of seniority rights to women returning from pregnancy leave, a refusal to allow females on maternity leave to use accumulated sick-days pay
during the term of pregnancy, and a forced maternity leave after the fifth
month of pregnancy. The denial of seniority rights had been specifically
decided by the Satty decision while the sick-days issue had been remanded
for further consideration. Other cases had supported a contention that inability to use sick-days for pregnancy is discriminatory. E.g., Zichy v. City
of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Also questionable was the company's mandatory maternity leave at the
fifth month of pregnancy. Cleveland Board of Education v. LeFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974), in which a mandatory leave regulation imposed upon teachers
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Count One: The ProceduralRight to Amend
The original Eberts complaint filed in the district court, alleging a single claim of discrimination per se based on the exclusion of pregnancy from the disability insurance plan, was
dismissed because of the Gilbert holding. The plaintiffs argued
on appeal that the district court's dismissal foreclosed the plaintiffs from presenting evidence to prove the discriminatory effect
or purpose of the company's plan. Since the Gilbert finding was
evidentiary in nature, 89 the particular factors which established
no discrimination in Gilbert were not necessarily applicable. 90
The Eberts court stressed these factors in differentiating between disability plans and other employment practices. 91 Having already decided that discrimination is decided on a case-bycase factual basis, there was no logical reason why the court
should not have further limited Gilbert solely to the facts of one
company's particular disability insurance plan.
Recognizing merit in the plaintiffs' arguments, the Eberts
court limited its scope of review to a determination of count one,
as pleaded in the original complaint. Since this had not included pleadings of the plan's discriminatory effect or purpose,
the court found the Gilbert holding that such a plan was facially
neutral controlling and affirmed the district court's dismissal.
was found to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
specifically spoke of the burden this policy imposed upon women: "By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the
exercise of these protected freedoms." Id. at 635 (emphasis added). Several lower court decisions invalidate this practice in Title VII actions. See
MacLennan v. American Airlines Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977) (a
required maternity leave was found discriminatory, and the court suggested a proper rule to be that the employee be allowed to continue work
until a doctor required her not to) and Newman v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F.
Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (a mandatory leave policy was found violative of
Title VII but the exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage was not).
In Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated, 434 U.S. 158 (1976), the Ninth Circuit had found a mandatory maternity leave not violative of the Title VII (although it had found the exclusion of pregnancy from the disability plan discriminatory). The Supreme
Court vacated this judgment for further consideration in light of the Satty
decision, and the appellate court remanded to the district court, 572 F.2d 709
(9th Cir. 1978).
In addition, the Eberts case involved allegations of written notices of
the condition of pregnancy and nine months of continuous service prior to
the maternity leave as conditions upon which the leave would be granted;
failure to meet these requirements would result in the leave being denied,
or termination. Since these requirements were not qualifications to the
granting of other non-disability leaves, a burden to women not suffered by
men seemed apparent. 581 F.2d at 362.
89. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
90. 581 F.2d at 362.
91. See note 76 supra.
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However, the court emphasized that its decision did not preclude the possibility that the complaint
could be amended to in92
clude these new contentions.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that leave to
amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires. '93 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that in the absence
of some compelling reason, such as undue delay or prejudice to
the opposing party, the plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to test a claim when the underlying facts relied on may be a
proper subject of relief.94 In Eberts, no evidentiary showing had
of undue
been presented by either side, suggesting that the9 risk
5
delay or prejudice to the defendant was minimal.
Furthermore, in the Eberts case there are facts present in
the original pleadings sufficient to establish a cause of action on
the issue of the discriminatory effect or purpose of the disability
plan. The possibility that Gilbert does not control on the discriminatory effect and intent claims is supported by the action
of the Court in Satty. Because the Gilbert decision was based
on evidence unique to the defendant, the Satty Court dismissed
the disability plan only after it reviewed the evidence and concluded that the plan was substantially the same as the Gilbert
plan. 96 However, in Eberts, the plaintiffs had been prohibited by
the district court's dismissal and the refusal of the defendants to
produce discovery information from proving its plan was different from the Gilbert plan. 97
92. 581 F.2d at 362. See notes 28 and 29 supra.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
94. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
95. Id. In Foman, the Supreme Court found the refusal of the district
court to allow amendment to the cause of action and the First Circuit Court
of Appeals' affirmation of that refusal to be an abuse of the court's discretion when no evidentiary showing had been presented by either side.
96. 434 U.S. at 143: "On the basis of evidence presented to the District
Court, petitioner's policy of not awarding sick-leave pay to pregnant em-

ployees is legally indistinguishable from the disability insurance program

upheld in Gilbert."
This conclusion was buttressed by the actions of the Satty petitioner
who failed to show a discriminatory effect and had admitted that the disability insurance plan was the same as the weekly sickness and accident insurance plan in Gilbert. Id. at 142. The Eberts plaintiffs, however, have

never made such an admission.
97. 581 F.2d at 359. The plaintiffs had requested, through a set of interrogatories served on the defendant, certain information relating to the operation of the company health plans. Such information would be
determinative in the plaintiffs' case to prove the aggregate protection under
the plan for women was less than that of the men. The defendant refused to
provide the information, calling the request irrelevant and onerous, and was
not required by the district court to produce the information.
The district court's view on this matter is to be contrasted with the view
of the Illinois Appellate Court in Illinois FEP Comm'n v. Hohe, 53 Ill. App.
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Additionally, new claims of discriminatory purpose or effect
advanced in other court actions are applicable to the Eberts
facts. The dissent in Gilbert argued that a defendant's total history regarding sex distinctions should be considered before the
possibility of discriminatory purpose is eliminated.9 8 The Satty
plaintiffs enlarged this idea by claiming that the court's finding
of discrimination by the denial of seniority rights inferred the
conclusion that the disability plan was part of an over-all design
to discriminate against women, compelling a finding of discriminatory intent. 99 The Satty Court did not specifically reject this
theory, but instead refused to consider it on procedural grounds,
leaving the final determination up to the district court. 100 Since
3d 724, 368 N.E.2d 709 (1977), where a subpoena calling for the production of
employment records and documents for a three-year period was determined not to be an unreasonable request if the records in question were
kept in the ordinary course of business.
Interestingly, on November 3, 1978, the National Labor Relations Board
directed the Westinghouse Corporation to provide statistical information on
women and minorities to the Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, a plaintiff in the Eberts suit, ruling that Westinghouse had failed to bargain in good faith by refusing to give the union the requested information.
Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 4, 1978, at 16, col. 2.
98. 429 U.S. at 150. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, objected
strongly to the majority's finding of no discriminatory intent because the
Court had limited its review to an evaluation of the plan without examination of the company history. He faulted the majority for "studiously ignoring" the district court's conclusion that General Electric's discriminatory
attitude was a motivating factor in its policy and went on to note in great
detail the company history in respect to women, concluding that the disability plan was a "tainted product" of a total company design that was not neutral toward women. Id.
99. 434 U.S. at 145. The only issue in Gilbert was the company's exclusion of pregnancy from the disability plan. Admitting that the disability
plan in Satty was the equivalent of that in Gilbert, the plaintiffs acknowledged that if this were the only way in which the women had been distinguished from the men by the defendant there would be no cause of action
because of the Gilbert preclusion. But, the plaintiffs emphasized that in
Satty two counts of discrimination had been alleged and the Court had
found the defendant's other practice-the denial of seniority service-to be
a discriminatory practice. The plaintiffs insisted that the exclusion of pregnancy from the disability plan must be judged in the context of the other
discriminatory practice to infer an over-all design to discriminate against
women, with the plan being a part of this design.
100. Id. at 145-46. The district court had not made a determination on
discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court disposed of this issue by stating
that while the denial of seniority rights might be relevant to the issue of
discriminatory intent, it was not conclusive and did not require such a finding by the district court. Since the district court had not found such an intent, the Supreme Court refused to consider it, supporting this refusal by
showing that the plaintiffs had abandoned attacks on other policies of the
company after the district court had ruled adversely. In the majority's opinion, the abandonment was inconsistent with the contention that all policies
of the company should be considered for determination of discriminatory
intent.
The dissenting portion of Justice Powell's opinion disagreed that the
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the Eberts court had made a similar finding of discriminatory
effects resulting from the company's other employment policies,
the same argument is viable in Eberts.
A further possible claim is that the disability plan results in
a discriminatory effect in violation of § 703(a) (1).101 Challenges
to the exclusion of pregnancy under a disability plan must be
found violative of § 703(a) (1) because, as the Satty Court held,
no such exclusion deprives an individual of employment status
or opportunity as required by § 703(a) (2).102 Discrimination
under § 703(a) (1) is especially difficult to prove because, although the holding of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 103 eliminated
the necessity of proving intent under § 703(a) (2),104 the applicability of Griggs to § 703(a) (1) has not been determined. Consequently, a violation under § 703(a) (1) still requires proof of a
discriminatory effect and intent.10 5 The Court refused to decide
abandonment showed inconsistency, and emphasized the "meandering
course" of adjudication in this area. He argued that this was not abandonment because of inconsistency, but because the lower court's erroneous application of the law in the pre-Gilbert era had made such pleadings
unnecessary. Since the plaintiffs' favorable rulings were now overturned by
Gilbert, Justice Powell urged that the Court follow the usual practice of
remanding the issue for further hearings when there has been a recent clarification of the law. Id. at 146 (Powell, J., concurring in part). See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
101. See note 82 supra. The right to amend pleadings in a Title VII case
to include a new theory has been addressed by several courts. In Jurinko v.
Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973), the court upheld a district court judgment on a theory that had not been an overt issue in the trial
may
nor in the pre-trial stipulation by concluding: "An appellate court ...
uphold a judgment on any theory which finds support in the record ...
Under Rule 15(b), F. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C., a liberal provision is made for
amendments to conform the pleadings to evidence,. . . even though no formal application is made to amend." Id. at 1045. See also Picture Music Inc.
v. Bourne Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972) (decision upheld on theory supported by record) and New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20 (4th
Cir. 1963) (pre-trial stipulation did not prevent court from applying legal
principles to facts disclosed by proof).
In Pennington v. Lexington School Dist. 2, 578 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1978)
the court remanded the issue of a denial of seniority rights on the basis of
the new Satty decision. Because the district court had tried the case before
Satty, the court felt there had been little guidance on the issues and suggested the district court reopen the record, if necessary, for introduction of
additional evidence. Id. at 549.
102. 434 U.S. at 145. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the necessity of
challenging disability insurance plans under § 703(a) (1) by stating that in
Gilbert the disability plan was challenged under § 703(a) (1) and that "appear(s) to be the proper section of Title VII under which to analyze questions of sick-leave or disability payments." Id.
103. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
104. See discussion at note 69 supra.
105. In his concurring opinion in Satty, Justice Stevens calls the distinction between the two sections "illusory," confessing that he cannot see the
distinction that the majority sees requiring intent. 434 U.S. at 154 n.4.
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the intent question in both Gilbert and Satty,10 6 so the possibility still exists that the Griggs standard will be applied to allow a
mere showing 10of7 a discriminatory effect to establish a violation
of § 703(a) (1).
A discriminatory effect is found when the disability plan is
worth more to men than women.'0 8 The specific allegations of
the Eberts complaint suggest the theory forwarded by Justice
Powell's opinion in Satty to prove the disability insurance plan
in Eberts is less valuable to women than to men. 10 9 Pregnant
females were forced to take a maternity leave in their fifth
month of pregnancy. During the leave they were prohibited
from using their accumulated sick-pay benefits. Males have no
comparable mandated leave; those who take a leave for any disability can use their accumulated sick pay and those who suffer
106. The Court concluded that a prerequisite to a determination of inten-

tional discrimination under § 703(a) (1) is a showing of a discriminatory effect of the challenged practice. Since both plaintiffs in Satty and Gilbert
had failed to prove the discriminatory effect of the disability insurance plan,
there was no need for the Court to determine the more inclusive issue of
whether intent was necessary for § 703(a)(1). Consequently, the Court re-

fused to address this question, leaving the challenge to the intent requirement under § 703(a)(1) an open issue. 434 U.S. at 144; 429 U.S. at 137.
107. The intent-necessity difference between the two sections is crucial

to future litigations. As the interpretation of § 703(a) (1) now stands, discrimination under this section can only be shown by 1) proof that the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability insurance plan is discriminatory on its
face (which has been foreclosed by Gilbert) or 2) a showing of an intentional policy to disadvantage one sex and a showing that such a disadvantaging effect has taken place.
If the Griggs standard is determined to apply to § 703 (a) (1), however,
the intent requirement in the second alternative is removed and only a discriminatory effect need be shown. Obviously, the lesser burden of proof
would benefit future plaintiffs.
The importance of this distinction has not escaped plaintiffs. In several
cases, plaintiffs who originally filed complaints under § 703(a) attempted to
amend to specifically challenge under § 703(a) (2) after the Satty decision
articulated the two sections' differences. See Grogg v. General Motors

Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the court allowed amendment to
bring suit under § 703(a) (2) on a challenge to a forced maternity leave policy, but refused amendment on a challenge to the disability insurance plan
on the grounds that the amendment would not alter the holding) and EEOC
v. Delta Air Lines Inc., [19781 17 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. (CCH) 8560 (the court
refused amendment to § 703(a) (2) from § 703(a) because the pre-requisite
discriminatory effect for both sections had not been proven).
In Pennington v. Lexington School Dist. 2, 578 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1978)
the plaintiff specifically brought suit against a denial of seniority rights
under § 703(a) (2) and the challenge was upheld on the basis of Satty.

108. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138.
109. 434 U.S. at 150-52. Justice Powell urged that a discriminatory effect
did result from the plan and the plaintiffs should be allowed to plead and
present evidence on this theory. His basis for allowing such a pleading on
remand, even though the plaintiffs had not originally advanced this theory,
was that the law regarding the necessity of such proof had only been recently clarified by Gilbert. See discussion at note 100 supra.
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from any ailment not classified as a disability under the plan are
not forced to take a leave. 110 Therefore, the combination of
forced maternity leave and a denial of sick-pay benefits under
the plan result in less net compensation for female employees.1 1'
Since the Satty Court refused to consider this theory on
procedural grounds, but did not expressly reject it, 1 12 it could be
advanced by the Eberts plaintiffs to prove a discriminatory effect.
CONCLUSION

At the time of the Eberts decision, classifications based on
pregnancy were no longer discriminatory per se because of
Gilbert,but could be found unlawful under the Satty "burdens"
test. Using this test, the Eberts court invalidated employment
practices which denied seniority rights to pregnant women,
forced them to take maternity leave, and restricted their eligibility for such leave. Other courts found that requiring women to
pay more into a pension fund,1 3 failing to renew employment
contracts of pregnant women, 114 and changing employment status because of maternity equally violates Title VII.115 Other
courts may follow the Eberts procedure in future litigations, and
hold Gilbert controlling over challenges involving disability insurance plans and then proceed to use the "burdens" test on all
other pregnancy-related employment practices. 116 Eberts fur110. 581 F.2d at 358.
111. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. at 150-52 for a full discussion
of this theory.
112. 434 U.S. at 146-47 n.6. The majority, in its footnoted response to Justice Powell's opinion on this issue, disagreed with his view that the law had
been unclear in the pre-Gilbert era. Contrary to everyone else's view, Justice Rehnquist felt the Gilbert impact was minimal:
[W] e do not think it (Gilbert) can rightly be characterized as so drastic
a change in the law as it was understood to exist in 1974 as to enable
respondent to raise or reopen issues on remand that she would not
under settled principle be otherwise able to do. Id.
The Court, therefore, refused to allow this theory to be pleaded on remand but did not specifically overrule its validity. Id.
113. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978).
114. Pennington v. Lexington School Dist. 2, 578 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1978).
115. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir.
1978).
116. Whether a reaction to public dissatisfaction with Gilbert or a desire
to return to the course followed prior to that decision, courts currently seem
determined to restrict Gilbert to its issues alone. The "burdens" test of
Satty, which supplies the distinguishing measure of discrimination on all
other pregnancy classifications, is viewed by some courts merely as a judicial procedure to dilute Gilbert without specifically overruling it.
In City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978),
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, said the majority's decision
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ther suggests that challenges to disability plans could be up11 7
held.
The difficulty in applying the "burdens" test is that it requires each practice to be weighed in the context of its own evidentiary circumstances and not pre-determined by a previous
court's holding that a similar practice did impose a discriminatory burden.
The 1978 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964118 eliminates this arduous case-by-case measurement. The enacting
provision defines pregnancy classifications as discrimination per
se and specifies that pregnant employees are to be treated
equally for all purposes, including fringe benefit coverage. 119
However, the statute does not provide a legislative solution to
the larger question of whether employment practices which affect only one gender on the basis of a disability other than pregnancy, or on the basis of other gender-related criteria, are
discriminatory. The language of the statute is addressed solely
20
to the treatment of pregnant employees.
A disability insurance plan which systematically denies coverage for all disabilities which are unique to one gender may
produce a discriminatory effect and still not be unlawful under
"cut-back" on Gilbert, although the majority said it "distinguished" that
holding:
A program such as the one challenged here does exacerbate gender
consciousness. But the program under consideration in General
Electric did exactly the same thing and yet was upheld against the
challenge . . . The Court's distinction between the present case and
GeneralElectric ... seems to be just too easy. For me it does not serve
to distinguish the case on any principled basis. I therefore must conclude that today's decision cuts back on General Electric ... I do not
say that is bad ... I feel, however, that we should meet the posture of
the earlier cases head-on and not by thin rationalizationthat seeks to
distinguish but fails in its quest. (emphasis added) Id. at 1383-84.
117. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
118. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
119. [19781 55 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9101. Under the statute, all seven
counts of the Eberts complaint, including the challenged disability insurance plan, would be violative of Title VII because the law makes no distinction between pregnancy-related classifications in disability insurance plans
or other employment policies.
120. Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2076. The enacting provision amends § 701 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by adding § 701(k):
(k) The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.
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the Amendment. 2 1 Furthermore, it is unclear whether a plan
which denies pregnancy benefits to the spouses of male employees, while covering all spouses for other medical benefits, would
122
fall under the Amendment.
The discriminatory effect of employment classifications not
covered by the Amendment must still be subjected to the Eberts
analysis for a "burden" imposed on women. Thus, some issues
of sex discrimination can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 12 3 leaving the development of the law at a stage in which it is
only a little bit pregnant.
Carole M. Cervantes

121. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting) where this issue was raised:
[Tihe shallowness of the Court's 'underinclusive' analysis is transparent. Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments that
befall humanity, and then systematically proceeded to exclude from
coverage every disability that is female-specific or predominantly afflicts women, the Court could still reason as here that the plan operated

equally: Women, like men, would be entitled to draw disability payments for their circumcisions and prostatectomies, and neither sex
could claim payment for pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other excluded female-dominated disabilities. Along similar lines, any disability that occurs disproportionately in a particular group-sickle-cell
anemia, for example---could be freely excluded from the plan without
troubling the Court's analytical approach. Id. at 152-53 n.5.
It is not mere speculation to say that litigation over non-pregnancy,
gender-based issues will occur. The March 4, 1979 Chicago Tribune, § 1, at
28, col. 5, reports the case of a female firefighter wishing to breastfeed her
baby in the firehouse. So far she has prevailed before the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission and a local court.
122. [1978 Special Report] 784 GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA), 5. Since
only males can have spouses who become pregnant, females could claim
that such a policy is discriminatory on its face.
123. Although the Amendment does not decide all sex discrimination issues, it does finalize the fact that an employer can no longer penalize employees in any way for becoming pregnant. "Whatever may have been the
reaction in Queen Victoria's time, pregnancy is no longer a dirty word."
Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973).

